The First Stage in Hendry’s Reduction Theory Revisited by Genaro, SUCARRAT
Département des Sciences Économiques
de l'Université catholique de Louvain
The First Stage in Hendry’s Reduction Theory 
Revisited
G. Sucarrat
Discussion  Paper   2006-41CORE DISCUSSION PAPER
2006/82




The reduction theory of David F. Hendry provides a comprehensive probabilistic
framework for the analysis and classi¯cation of the reductions associated with em-
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tions|given a commonplace theory of social reality, namely the joint hypotheses that
the course of history is indeterministic, that history does not repeat itself, and that
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When Trygve Haavelmo suggested that the n observations in a dataset could "be con-
sidered as one observation of n variables...following an n-dimensional joint probability
law" (1944, p. iii), his main aim was to convert more economists to the praxis of evalu-
ating economic theories against empirical economic data using statistical techniques. The
deeper question about how the joint n-dimensional probability distribution was related to
reality, however, he remained agnostic about. In his own words, the existence of such a
joint probability distribution "may be purely hypothetical" (same place, p. iii).1 Although
Haavelmo's ideas had a profound and immediate impact on contemporary economic anal-
ysis it nevertheless took until the 1970s and 1980s before a systematic approach to the
study of the relation between reality and models thereof in terms of probability concepts
developed in econometrics. At the centre of several important contributions during these
years, including Florens and Mouchart (1980, 1985), Hendry and Richard (1990), and
Florens et al. (1990), was the notion of a "probabilistic reduction", that is, the idea of
replacing a complex probabilistic structure with a simpler one through marginalisation
and/or conditioning, and led to the development of important econometric concepts like
weak exogeneity, strong exogeneity and super exogeneity (see Engle et al. (1983)).
The reduction theory of David F. Hendry (1995, chapter 9), where the term reduction
is used in a broader way than originally, provides a comprehensive probabilistic framework
for the analysis and classi¯cation of the simpli¯cations associated with empirical models.2
In Hendry's own words "it seeks to explain the origin of empirical models in terms of reduc-
tion operations conducted implicitly on the DGP [data generating process] to induce the
relevant empirical model" (1995, p. 344). Starting with the joint probability distribution
of the "complete set" of theory "variables relevant to the economy under investigation"
(same place, p. 345), the reduction theory distinguishes between twelve reduction op-
erations which ultimately leads to the empirical model. Although Hendry's theory is a
powerful and comprehensive framework for the analysis of the relation between models
and reality, it is nevertheless unable to provide an analysis on the same probability space
of the ¯rst stage|and hence of the subsequent stages|of reduction given a commonplace
theory of social reality. The commonplace theory consists of the joint hypotheses that,
1Later Haavelmo quotes Pareto: "Il n'y a pas de proposition qu'on ne puisse certi¯er vraie sous certaines
conditions, µ a determiner" (same place, p. 1). This might be taken as an indication on why he was agnostic
about the existence or "truthfulness" of such a joint distribution. Di®erently put, agreeing with Pareto
that truth is a complex issue and highly dependent on tests for it, Haavelmo chose to defer the topic rather
than engaging into a detailed and possibly futile discussion.
2Chapter 9 in Hendry (1995) is a revised version of Cook and Hendry (1994), which is based on Hendry
and Richard (1990).
1literally, a) the course of history is indeterministic, b) history does not repeat itself, and
c) the future depends on the past (historical inheritance). In philosophical jargon, that
the human world is made up of indeterministic, historically supervenient particulars.3 Ac-
cording to Hendry the economic mechanism under study, that is, the joint distribution of
the complete set of relevant theory variables de¯ned on the underlying probability space,
is an entity that can change but does not necessarily do so. According to the commonplace
theory of social reality on the other hand, relationships change all the time in a way that
is indeterministically (but not stochastically) dependent on the past. Conceptually this
is not necessarily incompatible with Hendry's view, but it would nevertheless imply that
the economic mechanism is constantly changing. As a consequence, Hendry's theory is
unable to provide a probabilistic analysis on the same underlying probability space when
relationships change. Moreover, according to Hendry the underlying probability space is
transformed|again|when data are collected, so the theory is unable to provide a prob-
abilistic analysis on the same underlying probability space of the relation between the
theory and data variables.
In this essay I propose a certain structure on the underlying outcome space with the
consequence that the associated probability space remains the same throughout all reduc-
tions in Hendry's theory. The proposed structure consists of devising the outcome set as
consisting of possible worlds made up of indeterministic and historically inherited partic-
ulars, and provides several gains and possibilities of which only a few are explored in this
essay. First, the formulation or choosing of theory variables can be seen as a simpli¯ca-
tion or some sort of "pre-marginalisation" of variables, and can thus be interpreted as the
"perspective" from which we study an issue. Second, a probabilistic de¯nition of measure-
ment validity, that is, the absence of measurement error, is enabled. Third, a history based
probabilistic de¯nition of indeterministic causality that nests discrete, continuous and "in-
terval" versions of probabilistic causality is proposed. Finally, mathematical expectation
conditional on an information set is re-interpreted.
More generally devising the outcome set as consisting of indeterministic worlds made up
of historically inherited particulars provides a bridge between econometric (/probabilistic)
reduction analysis and metaphysics, that is, the part of philosophy that deals with what
there exists and its nature. There is already a voluminous philosophical literature that
employs the idea of possible worlds to shed light on various metaphysical issues, and
by providing a bridge between these two literatures econometrics can bene¯t from these
insights.
3Throughout the essay I will employ philosophical terms which I explain only brie°y. Readers interested
in fuller explanations or further reading are referred to (say) Honderich (1995) and Craig (2000).
2The rest of this essay is organised into ¯ve sections. In the next, section 2, the most
relevant parts of Hendry's reduction theory is detailed. Section 3 describes and motivates
the structure of the outcome space that is proposed. Section 4 explains why the probability
space remains the same throughout the reductions, details in what sense the formulation
of theory variables can be seen as a simpli¯cation, and proposes probabilistic de¯nitions
of measurement validity, that is, absence of measurement error. Section 5 formulates the
proposed de¯nition of causality and re-interprets mathematical expectation conditional on
an information set. Finally, section 6 concludes and gives suggestions for further research.
2 The ¯rst stage in Hendry's reduction
theory
The purpose of Hendry's reduction framework is "to explain the origin of empirical models
in terms of reduction operations conducted implicitly on the DGP" (1995, p. 344), and
his framework details twelve reductions whose order is not unique.4 Since the focus in this
essay is on the ¯rst stage I concentrate on this in what follows.
The most informative account of the ¯rst stage of reduction is given in a single para-
graph in chapter 9 of Dynamic Econometrics (1995), which is an adaptation of Hendry
and Cook (1994). Most of the paragraph is about the concepts and actions involved in the
¯rst stage, so it seems useful to reproduce it here almost in its entirety. Note however that
I have modi¯ed Hendry's notation in order to retain a consistent notation throughout this
essay. Most importantly, random variables and vectors appear in capitals to distinguish
them from their realisations, which I denote in small letters later in the essay. The passage
is:
"The analysis begins with the complete set of random variables fU¤
tg relevant
to the economy under investigation over a time span t = 1;:::;T, where the su-
perscript ¤ denotes a perfectly measured variable U¤ = (U¤
1;:::;U¤
T), de¯ned
on the probability space (­;F;P) ...The fU¤
tg comprise all the potential vari-
ables from the economic mechanism under study which operates at the level
of U¤, and hence the vector U¤
t comprises details of every economic action of
every agent at time t in all the regions of the geographical space relevant to the
analysis. However, many of the fU¤
tig variables are either unobserved or badly
measured, so the term data is not strictly applicable to U¤
t. The mapping from
4The "important point", he says, "is that empirical relationships must arise from these reductions of
the DGP" (same place, p. 345).
3the economic mechanism to the data-generation process through the measure-
ment system is the ¯rst reduction, which can lose a vast amount of information,
and introduce inaccuracy but leads to a data-set which is denoted by fUtg.
At a conceptual level, all variables fU¤
tig are assumed to be measured as fUtig
although for some variables, the level of quanti¯cation may be low, possibly
even an arti¯cial entry of zero. The probability space (­;F;P) is transformed
by the measurement process (usually markedly) ..."|Hendry (1995, p. 345)
Thus the starting point of Hendry's reduction theory is a set of theory variables denoted
U¤ de¯ned on the probability space (­;F;P), and together U¤ and (­;F;P) constitute
the "economic mechanism". Furthermore, the actions of collecting and recording the data,
that is, the measurement process, produces a dataset U de¯ned on an altered probability
space (­0;F0;P0). This altered probability space (­0;F0;P0) together with the data vari-
ables U is called the "data generating process" (DGP). Schematically the ¯rst stage of
reduction is summarised in table 1.
3 The outcome set as consisting of possible worlds
If (­;F;P) denotes a probability space with ­, F and P being the outcome space, the
event space and the probability measure, respectively, then in what follows the elements
! 2 ­ will be referred to as "worlds" or "possible worlds". The purpose of this section is
to formulate and motivate the proposed structure of the worlds !. The proposed structure
serves as some sort of social ontology, that is, a theory of the nature of social reality, and is
contained in de¯nition 4 in the last subsection of this section. The preceding subsections
provide the details that leads up to de¯nition 4. The ¯rst subsection 3.1 presents the idea
of a possible world which in philosophy has proved very useful in analysing, discussing
and communicating many philosophical ideas and theories, and shows that there is no
loss of generality in interpreting the ! as worlds. Then, subsections 3.2 and 3.3 formalise
the ideas of contingent particularism and historically inherited particulars, respectively.
Finally, subsection 3.4 contains the de¯nition of outcomes sets consisting of indeterministic
worlds made up of historically inherited particulars.
3.1 Possible worlds
The idea of a world is normally credited to the German philosopher and mathematician
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646 - 1716) (Crane 1995).5 Intuitively a world contains
5Leibniz was religious and originally he used the idea to argue that the world is perfect because among
all the possible worlds God must have chosen the most perfect one, an idea that was ridiculed by Voltaire
4everything in the past, everything in the present and everything in the future, or in
Leibniz' own words "the entire sequence and the entire collection of all existing things"
(Theodicy, par. 8, G VI 107. Quoted in Parkinson 1995, p. 213). In contemporary
philosophy the notion is often associated with David Lewis (1941-2001), who describes
worlds as consisting of
"the planet Earth, the solar system, the entire Milky Way, the remote galaxies
we see through telescopes...Anything at any distance at all is to be included.
Likewise the world is inclusive in time. No long-gone ancient Romans, no long-
gone pterodactyls, no long-gone primordial clouds of plasma are too far in the
past, nor are the dead dark stars too far in the future, to be part of this same
world"|Lewis (1986b, p. 1)
Where Lewis di®er from Leibniz is with respect to how things are connected and with
respect to the existence of other worlds. Whereas Leibniz was a determinist and believed
in a single world, Lewis was a non-determinist and believed in the rather unusual thesis
that non-actual, possible worlds exist objectively and independent of thought because
"philosophy [his own?] goes more easily" if we believe so (1986b, p. vii).6 Although I
take side with Lewis in the determinism vs. indeterminism debate my view di®ers most
certainly from Lewis' regarding the existence of non-actual worlds, since I only see them
as useful mind-constructs not existing independent of thought.7
But do we really need the whole world for the purpose of econometric reduction anal-
ysis? Spatially, yes, if we want to ensure a complete analysis, but it is not necessary to
be all-including backwards and forward in time. Di®erently put, the worlds must contain
everything between a start point and an end point, but the portions outside this interval
are not really necessary although including them changes little. So henceforth I will devise
a world ! as a continuous time process fw(t) : t 2 [0;1)g of worldly states-of-a®airs w(t),
where [0;1) is contained in the set of real numbers R. The number 0 denotes an arbitrary
starting point, say, yesterday at midnight or four million years ago, and is not restrictive.
However, bounding worlds temporally backwards in time entails an implicit conditioning
on the realised history preceding 0. Backwards bounding thus means probabilities acquire
in his play Candide (Crane 1995). In today's philosophical usage however the term usually carries no
religious connotation.
6The whole book is a defence of this thesis but see in particular pp. vii-ix and pp. 133-135. For a brief
and amusing summary of other philosophers' reactions to Lewis's thesis, see Hawthorn (1995, footnote 24
pp. 23-24).
7For further philosophical issues and references regarding the idea of a possible world useful starting
points are Forbes (1995) and Moravcsik (1995). For an alternative but related use of the idea of a possible
world by an economist, see Kluve (2004).
5an interpretation of special interest, but apart from this the only function bounding serves
is to simplify the exposition.
Interpreting ! as worlds retains the intuitive use of probability algebra. For example,
if we want to say that A 2 F denotes the event that (say) 10% of the labour force of an
economy is unemployed at t, then the only change in interpreting the ! as a world is that
A now denotes the set of all worlds in which 10% of the labour force of a certain economy
is unemployed at t. More formally, A = f! : 10% unemployed at tg. If the worlds are
bounded backwards, then the interpretation becomes that A denotes the set of all worlds
in which 10% of an economy is unemployed at t given the history of the world up to
t = 0. Another common practice is to interpret the outcome set ­ as a set of possible
"states-of-a®airs" or "facts". In possible worlds terminology a state-of-a®air or fact at t is
now the set of all worlds in which a certain state-of-a®airs or fact attains at t. Finally, the
possible worlds interpretation also accommodates "interval" events. With respect to the
unemployment example, the event A now becomes the set of worlds in which 10% of the
labour force of an economy is registered as unemployed over the time interval, say, [t0;t1].
3.2 Contingent particularism
"I am inclined", in the words of Geo®rey Hawthorn, "to the view that the human world
consists of contingent particulars" (1995, p. 10). Contingency refers to the thesis that
social events are not connected in a deterministic manner, a question that has occupied
philosophers for thousands of years. There are at least two philosophical literatures of
relevance for this issue. The ¯rst is concerned with whether human being is endowed with
a socalled "free will" and if so what kind of free will. The second literature is the socalled
"philosophy of mind" literature and starts from two seemingly contradictory views. On
the one hand that human being presumably is made up of a ¯nite number of indivisible
objects, usually referred to as particles, and on the other hand that human being is capable
of a presumably in¯nite number of mental states (imagination, thought, etc.).8 Depending
on one's views on free will and on the relationship between mind and matter, a variety
of possible views on how social events are connected is possible. Since I am unlikely to
convince the reader of my belief in the indeterminism thesis unless she or he is already
8An entry on "free will" is contained in virtually any philosophy or metaphysics dictionary, see for
example Honderich (1995) or Kim and Sosa (1995), and usually contain further reading. A very acces-
sible introduction to these issues, which is based on the author's BBC lectures, is Searle (1991). Useful
introductions to the philosophy of mind are Kim (1996) and Heil (1998), the second being more advanced
than the ¯rst. A good text on the relation between mind and recent biological currents is Ruse (1988).
Texts that consider themselves to speci¯cally address issues of social ontology are Ruben (1985) and Pettit
(1993). A useful introduction to metaphysics as it is often conceived, a form of category theory, is Loux
(1998).
6a believer I merely state the thesis as some sort of axiom that I start from. Formally,
with respect to the probability space (­;F;P), indeterminism is simply characterised by
­ containing more than one element, that is, part a) in de¯nition 4.
The meaning of the philosophical idea of a "particular" is best understood when con-
trasted with its opposite, a "universal". In brief, something is said to be of particular
nature if there exists only one of its kind, whereas something is said to be of universal na-
ture if it is one out of several of its kind or type. Another way to put it is that a particular
refers to the unique and non-repeatable, whereas a universal refers to the repeatable. In
the current context particularism is the thesis that, literally, history does not repeat itself
(no two points in time are exactly equal in all respects).9 Formally this may be stated as
follows.
De¯nition 1. Worldly particularism. A world ! = fw(t) : t 2 [0;1)g 2 ­
is said to be made up of particulars if for all pairs t, t0 2 [0;1) such that t 6= t0
and w(t), w(t0) 2 !, then w(t) 6= w(t0).
3.3 Historically inherited particulars
A further thesis I start from is that the current and the future depends on and inherit
the characteristics of the past. Di®erently put, every turn history takes contributes in one
or another way to the characteristics of the worldly state-of-a®airs of the future. This
thesis I shall call "historical inheritance", but before providing a formal formulation of
this property we need the idea of a worldly state-of-a®airs process up to t.
De¯nition 2. Worldly state-of-a®airs process. The process !t = fw(a) :
a < t;t 2 (0;1)g ( ! is said to be a worldly states-of-a®airs process up to but
not including t.
So intuitively !t is a history up to t and note that the number 0 is not included in the
interval (0;1) in order to ensure that !t is non-empty. We can now de¯ne historical
inheritance.
9A further interpretation of the thesis that the human world is made up of particulars is that, literally,
people di®er from each other: No two persons are equal in all respects at any point in time. In the current
context, however, we only need the ¯rst interpretation.
7De¯nition 3. Historical inheritance. The outcome space ­ is said to consist
of worlds made up of historically inherited particulars if:
a) All ! 2 ­ are made up of particulars.
b) For all pairs of unequal worlds !1, !2 2 ­, that is, !1 6= !2: If !1
t 6= !2
t, then
w1(t0) 6= w2(t0) for all t0 2 [t;1), where w1(t0) 2 !1 and w2(t0) 2 !2.
In words, if two worlds contains the same history up to t (but not at t), then the two
worlds di®er from each other in at least one respect at every point in the future, that is,
from t and onwards.
3.4 Outcome sets consisting of indeterministic worlds made up of his-
torically inherited particulars
The proposed structure of the worlds ! is contained in de¯nition 4. The de¯nition sum-
marises the ideas of this section and provides the starting point for what follows.
De¯nition 4. Outcome set consisting of indeterministic worlds made up
of historically inherited particulars. Let (­;F;P) be a probability space and
let each ! 2 ­ be equal to a non-stochastic continuous time process fw(t) : t 2
[0;1)g with [0;1) ½ R. The outcome space ­ is said to consist of possible
worlds made up of indeterministic and historically inherited particulars if:
a) There exists more than one element in ­ (indeterminism).
b) For each ! 2 ­: For all pairs t, t0 2 [0;1) such that t 6= t0 and w(t), w(t0) 2 !,
then w(t) 6= w(t0) (particularism).
c) For each pair of unequal worlds !1, !2 2 ­, that is, !1 6= !2: If !1
t 6= !2
t then
w1(t0) 6= w2(t0) for all t0 2 [t;1), where w1(t0) 2 !1 and w2(t0) 2 !2 (historical
inheritance).
The ¯rst property a) essentially states that the course of history is indeterministic. If ­
contained only a single world, then this would imply that no other worlds are possible and
therefore that the course of history is deterministic. The second property b) makes use of
the notion "states-of-a®airs" at t which is denoted w(t), and essentially states that history
does not repeat itself. The third and ¯nal property c) imposes a certain structure on the
history-does-not-repeat itself property. Speci¯cally, it ensures that future properties are
shaped by the past, thus the terminology "historical inheritance".
84 The ¯rst stage in Hendry's reduction theory revisited
The probability space of de¯nition 4 in subsection 3.4|denoted (­;F;P)|and a set of
theory variables U¤ provide the starting point of this section. Together they constitute the
"revised" economic mechanism. Subsection 4.1 explains why (­;F;P) does not change
although social relationships change, whereas subsection 4.2 outlines an interpretation
of the formulation of theory variables that is of practical use in empirical econometrics.
Finally, subsection 4.3 proposes a formal de¯nition of measurement validity, that is, the
absence of measurement error, which is enabled by the property that (­;F;P) does not
change due to the measurement process.
4.1 An unchanging probability space
A useful distinction is that between social relationships on the one hand and representa-
tions thereof on the other. The economic mechanism, that is, U¤ together with (­;F;P),
is a probabilistic representation of social relationships. In other words, the economic mech-
anism is a picture of the landscape it depicts, not the landscape itself. When the landscape
change, so does the picture of it. This is Hendry's view in brief. The commonplace the-
ory of social reality, which holds that social reality and the associated relationships are
changing all the time since they would hinge on their exact historical and geographical
location, would therefore imply that the economic mechanism is changing all the time. An
unchanging probability space|even when social relationships are changing all the time|is
entailed by interpreting the outcome set as consisting of indeterministic worlds made up
of historically inherited particulars.
To see this consider the example of a two period series of 0-1 variables fX1;X2g,
that is, for t = 1;2 each Xt can take on the values 0 and 1. If px1x2 denotes the joint
probability of X1 = x1 and X2 = x2, then the set of joint probabilities fp00;p01;p10;p11g
is denoted p. In other words, p is a probabilistic representation of the social relationships
between X1 and X2. If the social relationships change, then the corresponding probabilistic
representation changes from p to p0. But must the underlying probability space change?
Not if ­ is interpreted as consisting of indeterministic worlds made up of historically
inherited particulars. Because then p and p0 can be treated as conditional on (say) a
third random variable that governs when p and p0 hold. Speci¯cally, let Y denote such
a third random variable which is equal to 0 whenever p holds, that is, f! : Y (!) = 0g is
the set of all worlds in which p holds, and which is equal to 1 whenever p0 holds, that is,
f! : Y (!) = 1g is the set of all worlds in which p0 holds. Intuitively, you may interpret
Y = 0 as (say) the absence of nuclear world wars for t = 1;2, and Y = 1 as their presence
9for t = 1;2. This gives p = fp000;p010;p100;p110g and p0 = fp001;p011;p101;p111g, and
provides four conditions for p = p0 to hold: p000 = p001;p010 = p011;p100 = p101 and
p110 = p111. In other words, the presence of an unchanging joint density of the theory
variables can be treated as as conditional on the worlds in which it does not change, and
hence the existence of an unchanging economic mechanism constitutes a reduction.
4.2 Formulation of theoretical variables as a reduction
Normative analysis is about how things should be, it is said, whereas positive analysis
is value-independent and "objective" investigation of how things are. But is positive
analysis entirely objective? Do we not, in any investigation, choose which questions to
address, which portions of social reality to study, and which categorical schemes, concepts,
techniques and language to employ? The idea that these choices are non-objective in
some sense is old and not controversial. Examples of economists who held this view
are Max Weber (1994), Joseph Schumpeter (1949) and Gunnar Myrdal (1953, pp. vii-
viii; 1969). Since a world contains everything and since the outcome set contains all
the possible worlds, the formulation of theoretical variables de¯ned on the probability
space can be seen as re°ecting some of these choices. In particular, the formulation of
theoretical variables can be seen to re°ect which portions of reality that are studied as
opposed to others, that is, as some sort of "pre-marginalisation" of the variables that
are not studied. (The term "pre-marginalisation" is due to the fact that marginalisation
of the unimportant|according to some criteria|variables of the set that is considered
takes place later in the reduction process.) Di®erently put, the formulation of theoretical
variables can be seen as the "conceptual lenses" we view reality with. For example, in
delineating and de¯ning theoretical price and theoretical quantity, then other aspects of the
transaction process are not included in the analysis. This is clearly an abstraction, since
an anthropologist or an institutional economist might be interested in whether the parties
engaged in any form of negotiation, whether there were implicit power-relations governing
the transaction process, or what the means of transactions were. All this and many
other aspects of the transaction are excluded from the analysis when the only theoretical
variables delineated are price and quantity. With the modi¯ed probability space the
selection of which portions of reality to analyse and the way they are depicted in terms of
variables can be treated as a simpli¯cation.
104.3 A probabilistic de¯nition of measurement validity
In the methodological literature of the social sciences, discussions of measurement error
are often couched in terms of theoretical or nominal or concept de¯nition vs. measure
or indicator or operational de¯nition|see for example de Vaus (2001, pp. 24-33), Punch
(1998, pp. 47-48) and Crano and Brewer (2002, pp. 5-12). That is, to what extent
a measure (say, the number of people receiving unemployment bene¯ts) is capable of
providing information about a theoretical de¯nition (say, the number of unemployed). An
operational de¯nition that satisfactorily provides the information sought is thus said to
be measurement valid or concept valid.
To see that the collection of data variables does not alter the underlying probability
space, recall that any realisation of the data variable U corresponds to the worlds in which
the data were collected or could have been collected. For example, for any realisation ut
of Ut there is an associated set of possible worlds f! : Ut(!) = utg in which these data
realisations can be obtained. Also, if we would like to restrict ourselves to the worlds
enabled by history, then we can restrict ourselves to the intersection of f! : Ut(!) = utg
and the set of possible worlds enabled by the course of history preceding t.
To repeat, random variables are denoted in capitals and their realisation in small










tI(t)) for each t, where the
symbolism I(t) means the number of theoretical variables can vary with t. Similarly,
a realisation of the vector of data variables U is denoted u = (u1;u2;:::;ut;:::;uT),
with ut = (ut1;ut2;:::;utj;:::;utJ(t)) for each t, where the symbolism J(t) means the
number of data variables can vary with t. J(t) may of course di®er from I(t). Ideally
a de¯nition of measurement validity of U¤ should be sequential and formulated for a




T;UT), where at each t one may
(or may not) condition on history and/or on data realisations preceding t. However, such
a de¯nition complicates notation considerably so I only provide the de¯nition for a generic
t only, (U¤
t;Ut), since the extension to t = 1;2;:::;T is straightforward. Now, recall the
de¯nition of a measurable variable.
De¯nition 5. Measurable variable. Let (­;F) and (­¤;G¤) denote two mea-
surable spaces, that is, F and G¤ are ¾-¯elds on ­ and ­¤, respectively, and denote
the elements of F and G¤ for F and G¤, respectively. A function f : ­ ¡! ­¤ is
said to be F-measurable if for all G¤ 2 G¤ we have f! : f(!) 2 G¤g 2 F.
In the case where ­¤ is Euclidean space then f is a random vector. For notational conve-
11nience I will use the symbolism f : (­;F) ¡! (­¤;G¤) to mean that f is a F-measurable
function from ­ to ­¤, with F and G¤ being the associated ¾-¯elds. Now, consider the
two measurable variables
U¤
t : (­;F) ¡! (X¤
t;G¤




t2 £ ¢¢¢ £ X¤
tI(t) and Xt = Xt1 £ Xt2 £ ¢¢¢ £ XtJ(t), and think of
the ¯rst as the theory variable and the second as the data variable. The elements of F,
G¤
t and Gt will be referred to as worldly events at t, theory events at t and data events
at t, respectively. Measurement validity of the data event Gt 2 Gt with respect to the
theoretical event G¤
t 2 G¤
t can now be de¯ned in terms of equality between the worldly
events f! : U¤
t(!) 2 G¤
tg 2 F and f! : Ut(!) 2 Gtg 2 F. In words, to what extent the
set of possible worlds associated with a certain data realisation equals the set of worlds
associated with the theory event it purports to measure. Generalised the idea can be
summarised in the following de¯nition.
De¯nition 6. Measurement validity of data events. A data event Gt 2 Gt
is said to be:
a) measurement valid with respect to a theory event G¤
t 2 G¤
t if f! : Ut(!) 2
Gtg = f! : U¤
t(!) 2 G¤
tg.
b) measurement invalid with respect to a theory event G¤
t 2 G¤
t if f! : Ut(!) 2
Gtg \ f! : U¤
t(!) 2 G¤
tg = ;.
c) partially measurement valid with respect to a theory event G¤
t 2 G¤
t if f! :
Ut(!) 2 Gtg 6= f! : U¤
t(!) 2 G¤
tg and f! : Ut(!) 2 Gtg\f! : U¤
t(!) 2 G¤
tg 6= ;.
For convenience we may say that a data event is measurement valid, invalid or partially
valid, respectively, since it is implicitly understood that the validity is with respect to a cer-
tain theory event. The extensions to theoretical variables is more or less straightforward,
but for convenience I only provide the de¯nition for measurement validity.
De¯nition 7. Measurement validity of a data variable. A data variable
Ut : (­;F) ¡! (Xt;Gt) is said to be measurement valid if each Gt 2 Gt is
measurement valid.
Implicitly the de¯nition thus assumes there is a theory variable U¤
t : (­;F) ¡! (X¤
t;G¤
t )
de¯ned on the probability space (­;F;P). Finally, a de¯nition of almost sure measurement
validity can be formulated.
12De¯nition 8. Almost sure measurement validity of a data variable.
Consider a data variable Ut : (­;F) ¡! (Xt;Gt) and denote the set containing
measurement valid data events for G1








t , then Ut said
to be measurement valid almost surely.
The modi¯ed framework is summarised in table 2.
5 A history based probabilistic de¯nition of indeterministic
causality
Discussions over what the appropriate de¯nition of causality is for econometrics enjoys a
reasonably long history, for overviews and references see amongst others Geweke (1984),
Aigner and Zellner (1988), and Bauwens et al. (forthcoming). Most of the suggested
de¯nitions have put more weight on empirical implementability rather than philosophical
justi¯cation, which is understandable given econometrics' nature. In this sense the de¯-
nition outlined here distinguishes itself by explicitly giving more weight to philosophical
considerations rather than empirical implementation. Indeed, I believe that the principal
use of the notion of causality proposed here is conceptual analysis rather than empirical
analysis. The main characteristic of the de¯nition is that it conceives causality as having
two aspects, historical possibility and causal e±ciency, and the section proceeds in four
steps. In the ¯rst subsection the idea of historical possibility is introduced and discussed,
and in the second causal e±ciency. Subsection 5.3 brings out the most important simi-
larities and di®erences between the proposed de¯nition and David Lewis' ideas, whereas
the ¯nal subsection relates the ideas in this section to a common de¯nition of causality in
econometrics, namely mathematical expectation conditional on an information set.
5.1 Historical possibility
The ¯rst aspect of causality is in a sense obvious. How can an event C be considered as
a cause of another event E if the second event is not even possible given the ¯rst? The
approach to possibility pursued here is that of historical possibility, that is, the idea that
what is possible tomorrow depends crucially on where we stand today. In other words,
the course of history up to t determines what is possible at and after t. Before we can
de¯ne this idea formally we need a de¯nition of history.
De¯nition 9. History up to t. Let !t be a state-of-a®airs process up to t. The
event Ht = f! : !t ( !g 2 F is said to be a history up to t.
13In words Ht is the set of all possible worlds that contain the state-of-a®airs process !t and
intuitively Ht is exactly what its name suggests, namely history up to t. Now, a possible
or historically possible event is de¯ned as follows.
De¯nition 10. A historically possible event. Let Ht1, Et2 2 F where t1 · t2
and where Ht1 is a history up to t. Et2 is said to be a possible event with respect
to the history Ht1 if Ht1 \ Et2 6= ;.
In words, the event Et2 at t2 is said to be historically possible or possible for short if at least
one of its worlds is contained in history. Similarly, an event is impossible if Et2 \Ht1 = ;,
since Ht by construction contains the set of all possible worlds containing the course of
history up to and including t. A consequence of de¯nition 10 is that situations where Et2\
Ht1 6= ; and P(Et2\Ht1) = 0, that is, that Et2 is possible but probabilistically impossible,
are not excluded from the outset. Situations where the e®ect precedes its cause are on
the other hand excluded from the outset by the condition t1 · t2. Another characteristic
of the de¯nition is that it allows for events being causal for some t but not necessarily at
all t. In particular, the de¯nition allows for socalled "single case" causality with "many
case" causality being obtained as a probabilistic reduction. Finally, the de¯nition resolves
a problem discussed by Salmon (1993b, 1993a). In his view the de¯nitions of probabilistic
causality put forward by Reichenbach (1956), Good (1961, 1962 and 1963) and Suppes
(1970) all su®er from the fact "that they attempt to carry out the construction of causal
relations on the basis of probabilistic relations among discrete events..." (1993b, p. 151).
In other words, they fail to take into account the continuous processes that connect events.
Salmon (1993a) himself proposed a solution that takes "processes rather than events as
basic entities" (same place, p. 155). The current approach follows in the same vein and
thus constitutes an alternative to Salmon's approach. Speci¯cally the current approach
takes continuous states-of-a®airs processes (that is, worlds) as basic entities with the
consequence that discrete and continuous accounts|indeed, even "interval" accounts|of
causality are reconciled in a neat manner.
5.2 Causal e±ciency
De¯ning possibility in this way means conditional probability suggests itself as a measure
of causal e±ciency. Heuristically a cause is said to be more e±cient than another if the
¯rst is more likely to bring about the event in question, and formally we may de¯ne this
as follows:
14De¯nition 11. Causal e±ciency. Let Ha
t1, Hb
t1 2 F denote two di®erent
histories, that is, !a
t1 6= !b
t1, and consider the event Et2 2 F where t1 · t2.
Further let P(Et2 \ Ha
t1), P(Et2 \ Hb






t1 is said to be causally more e±cient than
Hb





t1 are said to be causally equally
e±cient in bringing about Et2.
As an example, let Ha
t1 and Hb
t1 denote two di®erent policy choices, say, increasing the
interest rate with 0.5%-point and no-change, respectively, and let Et2 denote the desired
policy objective, say, a yearly in°ation of 2.5% two years into the future. The conditions
Et2\Ha
t1 6= ; and Et2\Hb
t1 6= ; essentially state that the policy choices in question both are
capable of bringing about the desired objective Et2. So if, say, P(Et2jHa
t1) > P(Et2jHb
t1),
then alternative a is more likely to attain Et2 than alternative b.
How does all this relate to the more common idea of an event Ct1 being the cause of an
e®ect Et2, most often expressed in terms of P(Et2jCt1)? The answer lies in the structure of
the underlying outcome space. Recall that each element in the outcome space is devised as
a continuous time process of states-of-a®airs from 0 and onwards. This means P(Et2jCt1)
can be interpreted as the probability of the event Et2 given the event Ct1, and given
history up to but not including t = 0. This is why bounding worlds backwards produces
a particularly interesting interpretation of conditional probabilities. Moreover, it is not
necessary for worlds to be unbounded forward for this interpretation to obtain. Worlds
may just as well be devised as ¯nite non-stochastic continuous time processes starting at
t = 0 and ending when t = T. Similarly, the probability P(E) where E is an arbitrary
event in the event-set can be interpreted as the probability of E coming about conditional
on history up to but not including t = 0.
5.3 David Lewis' ideas compared
The account of causality outlined here is similar in so many ways to Lewis' account that
one may ask where they actually di®er. They do di®er in many ways but the most
important are three. The ¯rst was alluded to in subsection 3.1 and concerns the existence
of possible worlds. Whereas Lewis believed other worlds exist objectively and independent
of thought, I believe they originate in our imagination. Second, Lewis aims to provide a
framework that "can serve alike under indeterminism or determinism" (1986d, p. 179).
The account outlined here on the other hand has been formulated with indeterminism in
mind, and I am not ready to say yet how related they are in the case when the outcome
15space only contains a single world, which can be interpreted as a version of determinism.
Third, Lewis' account "is in terms of counterfactual conditionals about probability; not
in terms of conditional probabilities" (same place, p. 178). Here, conditional probability
is one of two aspects of causality and (formal) counterfactual conditionals play no role.
With respect to similarities the most important is how close my ideas regarding causal-
ity are to Lewis' (1986a) view on causal explanation|in particular sections I and II. An-
other similarity concerns the interpretation of probability. Events, that is, elements of F,
are sets of possible worlds, and the conditional probability (say) P(EjC) is the objective
propensity of the event C to bring about the event E. In other words, conditional prob-
ability may apply to single instances of cases. The propensity (probability) is interpreted
in the objective sense as opposed to the subjective, but this should not be interpreted as
a critique against subjective accounts of probability. Indeed, in the words of Lewis:
"We subjectivists conceive of probability as the measure of reasonable par-
tial belief. But we need not make war against other conceptions of probabil-
ity, declaring that where subjective credence leaves o®, there nonsense begins.
Along with subjective credence we should believe also in objective chance. The
practice and analysis of science require both concepts"|(1986e, p. 83).10
5.4 Conditional expectations re-interpreted
It is common in econometrics to model the impact of one set of variables on another by
means of conditional expectations. In its general form such conditional expectations may
be denoted E(XtjI = I), where Xt is the random variable or variables in question, I is
a ¾-¯eld contained in F and I 2 I.11 A common example are socalled "¯ltrations". If
Xt = fX0;X1;:::;Xtg denotes as sequence of the random variable up to and including t,
then the sequence of ¾-¯elds generated by X0;X1;:::;Xt, commonly denoted I0;I1;:::;It
and called "information-sets", is the ¯ltration of Xt if it is the case that It¡1 ½ It and
It ½ F for each t. As a consequence, the conditional expectation E(XtjIt¡1 = It¡1) is
often referred to as the conditional expectation of Xt on all the information available up
to t, and sometimes even the true conditional expectation. This is a peculiar practice if
the information-set is interpreted to contain what its name suggest, namely information.
The structure of the outcome space permits us to distinguish between two distinct
but compatible and complementary ideas, history and information. Let It 2 F denote the
10Essentially this essay is Lewis' account of the relation between subjective and objective versions of
probability. See also Lewis (1986c).
11Little is lost by restricting our attention to conditional expectations, since the conditional probability
of an event A given and event B is obtained by taking the conditional expectation of the indicator function
of A. For instance, E(IAjF = B) = P(AjB).
16event that an entity (a person, a group of persons, or whatever) possesses or uses a speci¯c
piece or pieces of information at t, and let Ht 2 F denote history up to and including t
as de¯ned above. Two useful distinctions can be made. Between correct and incorrect
information of the past on the one hand, and between complete and incomplete information
of the past on the other. More formally, sets of correct and incorrect information are
characterised by It \ Ht 6= ; and It \ Ht = ;, respectively, and sets of complete and
incomplete correct information by It \Ht = Ht and It \Ht ( Ht, respectively. This gives
three cases. The ¯rst case is when the information in the information-set is both correct
and complete, and is of course entirely unrealistic. Formally, It = Ht. The second case is
when It contains some correct information, but not all the correct information that exists.
Formally, It \ Ht 6= ; and It ( Ht. Finally, the third case is when It contains incorrect
information only. Formally, It 6= ; and It \ Ht = ;.
The point I am driving at is intuitively obvious, namely that in practical econometrics
our information is both incomplete and possibly incorrect, and that we use this suboptimal
information in estimating conditional expectations. An attempt to formalise this idea
could be the following. The "correct" or true expectation conditional on history is given
by E(XtjF = Ht), whereas what the econometrician in practice estimates is E(XtjIt = It)
where It is an incomplete and possibly partially incorrect information set. Denoting this
estimate by ^ E(XtjIt = It), we may say that one of the key concerns of econometrics is
that of e±ciently choosing and making use of information such that ^ E(XtjIt = It) is as
close to E(XtjF = Ht) as possible.
6 Conclusions
In this essay I have argued that the underlying outcome space in Hendry's (1995) reduction
theory can usefully be interpreted as consisting of possible worlds made up of indetermin-
istic and historically inherited particulars. Although the human world is changing all
the time in indeterministic ways, the interpretation means reductions can be analysed on
the same underlying probability space. This enables several useful concepts and inter-
pretations, of which only a few have been explored in this essay. First, the formulation
of theoretical variables can be seen as the "perspective" from which an issue is studied.
Second, probabilistic de¯nitions of the absence of measurement error are put forward.
Third, a history based probabilistic de¯nition of indeterministic causality that nests dis-
crete, continuous and "interval" versions is proposed. Fourth, mathematical expectation
conditional on an information set is re-interpreted. Finally and more generally, a bridge
between econometric (/probabilistic) reduction analysis and metaphysics is provided.
17This suggest many possible lines for further research, both within the theory and
practice of econometrics, only three will be outlined here. First, the unmodi¯ed version
of Hendry's reduction theory cannot provide an analysis between continuous time theory
models and discrete time theory models, whereas the revised version can provide such
an analysis, since worlds|by construction|are non-stochastic continuous time processes.
For instance, a view that has gained widespread acceptance lately is that volatility forecasts
of discrete time models of ¯nancial returns should be evaluated against more e±cient
estimates derived from continuous time theory, see for example Andersen and Bollerslev
(1998), Andersen et al. (1999), and Andersen et al. (2005). However, such a practice
constitutes a restriction on the discrete time model, since the discrete time models may
be compatible with many classes of continuous time models. This leads to the question
of how one may analyse the probabilistic reduction such a restriction entails. The notions
of subsection 5.4, where conditional expectation on an information-set was re-interpreted,
can be used for such a comparison in terms of the distance between E(¾tjF = Ht), the
"true" volatility given by history, and E(^ ¾1
tjI1
t = I1
t ) and E(^ ¾2
tjI2
t = I2
t ), respectively, one
(say) discrete and one (say) continuous time model that condition on di®erent information
sets.
Second, the notion of weak stationarity plays a central role in dynamic econometrics
and is cast in terms of marginal entities. To recall, a series fYtgT
t=1 is de¯ned as weakly
stationary if E(Yt) = ¹ for all t, and given any t we have that E(Yt ¡ ¹)(Yj ¡ ¹) = ¾j
for all j (that is, ¾j does not depend on t). However, everything in the human world
is conditional and so it seems natural that this is taken into account in the de¯nition of
weak stationarity. Speci¯cally, a straightforward extension is to reformulate the de¯nition
of weak stationarity as conditional on a collection of events. Indeed, I would be very
surprised if such a de¯nition has not already been proposed and used (although I have
been unable to ¯nd one in econometric literature). Denote a collection of such conditioning
events as Ia = fIa
1;:::;Ia
Ng, where Ia ½ F but where Ia is not necessarily a ¾-¯eld. An
example of a "conditional" de¯nition of weak stationarity with respect to Ia would then
be that, for all Ia 2 Ia, E(YtjF = Ia) = ¹ for all t, and given any t we have that
E[(Yt ¡ ¹)(Yj ¡ ¹)jF = Ia] = ¾j for all j. Breaks or change in stationarity could then
be sought explained in terms of a change from one collection of conditioning events Ia
to another set Ib. For example, a "break" from ¹ to ¹0 could be sought explained in
terms of a change in circumstances Ia, say, the existence of the Bretton Woods Order of
international ¯nance, to Ib, say, the breakdown of the Bretton Woods Order. This would
provide a conceptual solution and a unifying framework to study such ideas as co-breaking
(Hendry and Massmann 2005), changing "unconditional" volatilities (Engle and Gonzalo
182005; how can changes in unconditional volatiliy be explained unless the change is due to a
change in economic or other circumstances?) and "common features" (Engle and Kozicki
1993).
Finally, the purpose of Hendry's (1995) reduction theory is to provide a probabilistic
framework for the analysis of the relation between portions of human reality and empir-
ical econometric models thereof. However, by means of a straightforward extension the
relation between abstract economic theories and empirical econometric models can also be
analysed probabilistically within the revised reduction theory. The extension consists of
augmenting the outcome space ­ with|if needed|the impossible worlds whose subsets
all have probability equal to zero, so that the augmented outcome space ­+ now contains
both the possible worlds and the impossible worlds needed for the study of how theory
models and empirical models are related probabilistically. Probabilistic analysis of the
relation between abstract theory models and empirical models can then be conducted in
terms of the probabilistic de¯nitions of measurement validity in section 4.3, and constitutes
a powerful probabilistic alternative to Stigum's (2003) account of the "bridge" between
theory and data.
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Reduction
no.
Starting point and resulting reduction Action
The economic mechanism under study:
The theory variables U¤ = (U¤
1;:::;U¤
T)
de¯ned on the probability space (­;F;P)
Data collection and recording of Ut 2
U, that is, the process of trying to
measure the U¤
t 2 U¤ variables
1. The data generation process (DGP): The
data set U = (U1;:::;UT) de¯ned on the
transformed probability space (­0;F0;P 0)
Table 2: Starting points, actions and resulting reductions associated with Hendry's theory when




Starting points and resulting reductions Action
A probability space (­;F;P), where
the outcome-space ­ consists of possible
worlds made up of indeterministic and
historically inherited particulars
The delineation and de¯nition of




1. The economic mechanism under study:
The theory variables U¤ = (U¤
1;:::;U¤
T)
de¯ned on the probability space (­;F;P)
Data collection and recording of Ut 2
U, that is, the process of trying to
measure the U¤
t 2 U¤ variables
2. The data generation process (DGP): A
data realisation u = (u1;:::;uT) of the
data variables U = (U1;:::;UT) de¯ned
on the probability space (­;F;P)
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